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A CASE FOR HARMLESS ERROR REVIEW
OF AKE ERRORS
Tuggle v. Netherland, 116 S. Ct. 283 (1995) (per curiam)
I. INTRODUCrION
In Tuggle v. Netherland,' the Supreme Court ruled that the state of
Virginia's use of a psychiatric expert's testimony at trial to prove part
of its case against Tuggle, an indigent capital defendant, was an Ake
error2 because the trial judge denied funds for Tuggle to hire a rebut-
tal expert.8 The Court then remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals to determine whether that error was harmless.4 The
Fourth Circuit held that it was harmless5 and the Supreme Court
agreed on appeal 6
Tuggle's case illustrates precisely why harmlessness review of an
Ake error is appropriate. Tuggle's sentencing jury heard both prop-
erly and improperly admitted evidence. 7 Considering that evidence
within the parameters of Virginia's statutory scheme, the jury found
two aggravating circumstances: vileness of the crime and future dan-
gerousness of the defendant." The improperly admitted evidence
1 Tuggle v. Netherland, 116 S. Ct. 283 (1995) (per curiam) [hereinafter Tuggle V].
2 Id. at 285 (construing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985)). In Ake, decided a few
months after the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed Tuggle's death sentence, the Supreme
Court held that such denial is an unconstitutional violation of an indigent defendant's
right to the "basic tools" of an adequate defense. Ake, 470 U.S. at 74. In fact, the Ake
decision cited 42 states that require the state government to provide such expert assistance
to indigents, particularly in capital cases. Id. at 78-79 n.4.
The violation is based on the United States Constitution's Sixth Amendment right to a
fair trial. The Sixth Amendment reads in full:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
S Tugge V, 116 S. Ct. at 285.
4 Id. at 285-86.
5 Tuggle v. Netherand, 79 F.3d 1386, 1396 (4th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Tuggle W].
6 Tuggle v. Netherland, 117 S. Ct. 237 (1996) [hereinafter Tuggle VI].
7 Tuggle Vi, 79 F.3d at 1391-92.
8 Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 334 S.E.2d 838, 844 (Va. 1985) [hereinafter Tuggle I].
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about Tuggle's future dangerousness9 was unrelated to the jury's deci-
sion that the murder was vile.10 Since a Virginia capital sentence can
stand even if supported by only one aggravating circumstance, the im-
proper evidence was indeed harmless because it invalidated only the
"future dangerousness" aggravator. 11
As this case illustrates, there are times where an appellate court
should perform harmless error analysis of Ake errors. Rather than au-
tomatically going through a complete resentencing, the reviewing
court should decide whether the error infected the jury's deliberation
so thoroughly that it caused an unconstitutional defect in the trial.
The saga of Lem Tuggle came to a close on December 12, 1996.
Twelve years after his conviction for the rape and murder of Jessie
Geneva Havens, Tuggle was executed by the state of Virginia. 12
H. BACKGROUND
A. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN CAPITAL CASES SINCE 1UR44AN V.
GEORGIA
When the United States Supreme Court invalidated the Georgia
and Texas capital punishment statutes in 1972,13 it in effect abolished
capital punishment as it then existed in the United States. 14 The
Furman Court held, in a one paragraph per curiam opinion, that the
challenged state laws constituted cruel and unusual punishment 5 as
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion.16 The essence of the concurring opinions17 was that the lan-
9 Tuggle V, 79 F.3d at 1392.
10 See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (Michie 1950).
11 Id. The Virginia Code reads:
The penalty of death shall not be imposed unless the Commonwealth shall prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt [that the defendant is] a continuing serious threat to society,
or that his conduct in committing the offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horri-
ble or inhuman, in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or aggravated battery to
the victim. Id.
12 Recaptured Murderer Executed in rginia, N.Y. TMES, Dec. 16, 1996, at B1l.
13 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
14 Carol S. Steiker &Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades
of Constitutionol Regulation of CapitalPunishmen 109 IAav. L REv. 355,362 (1995). Furman
in effect invalidated the capital statutes of 39 states, the District of Columbia and the fed-
eral government. Id. at 357.
15 Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40.
16 The Eighth Amendment reads in full: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor ex-
cessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend.
Vin.
17 justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White and Marshall concurred in the opinion.




guage of the statutes was overly broad.18 In particular, the Court
pointed to the statutes' potential for allowing (1) too many or too few
capital sentences and (2) capital sentences out of proportion with the
crime.1 9
1. Overinclusion and Underinclusion
The justices objected to the statutes' failure to limit or channel
the sentencer's discretion.20 Because the statutory parameters for im-
posing the death penalty were vague,2 1 sentencing bodies exercised a
great deal of discretion in their decision-making and invoked the pun-
ishment inconsistently.22 The result was two common problems with
capital sentences: overinclusion and underinclusion.2 3 Overinclusion
occurs when nearly any killing can qualify for capital punishment.2 4
Underinclusion is the imposition of the death penalty inconsistently
from one trial to the next, resulting in less harsh penalties for equally
heinous crimes.2 5 When the Court upheld some revised capital
statutes four years later, it reiterated that overinclusion and underin-
clusion create arbitrary and capricious results that violate the funda-
mental notions of fairness protected by the Eighth Amendment.26
2. Proportionality
The Court also banned death sentences unless the defendant was
a major participant in a dangerous felony and exhibited a reckless
indifference to human life; that is, the punishment had to be propor-
tional to the crime.2 7 At one point, the Court construed the propor-
tionality doctrine so narrowly that only those who had killed,
attempted to kill or intended to kill another human were eligible for
the death penalty.2 8 However, between 1977 and 1994, states exe-
18 The invalidated Georgia statute, for example, gave the factfinder discretion to sen-
tence a defendant to death, life imprisonment, or a term of one to twenty years upon
conviction for forcible rape. See GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1302 (Supp. 1971).
19 Furman, 408 U.S. at 308-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
20 Id. (Stewart,J., concurring).
21 See, e.g., Baugus v. State, 141 So. 2d 264, 266 (Fla.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 879 (1962)
(stating that the decision to impose death as a punishment for murder was to be "deter-
mined purely by the dictates of the consciences of the individual jurors").
22 Furman, 408 U.S. at 308 n.8 (Stewart, J., concurring).
23 Id. at 291 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 311
(White, J., concurring).
24 Coker v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 584, 592-97 (1977) (plurality opinion).
25 Furman, 408 U.S. at 311 (White, J., concurring).
26 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976) (plurality opinion).
27 See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987); see also Steiker & Steiker, supra note
14, at 376-77.
28 See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982).
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cuted ten non-triggermen who were convicted of felony murder.2 9
The Supreme Court allows felony murder to qualify as a capital crime
whether the accomplice kills intentionally or accidentally.30
3. The States' Response to Furman
States reacted to Furman by revising their statutes to address the
problems of underinclusion, overinclusion, and proportionality. The
new capital statutes listed aggravating circumstances that, if present,
designated certain killings as capital crimes.31 Because the statutes re-
quired the presence of aggravating circumstances before the death
penalty could be considered, they limited the discretion of juries and
judges and thus solved the inclusion problems.3 2 The statutory pa-
rameters also solved the proportionality discrepancies by setting objec-
tive standards for prosecutors to determine whether to seek the death
penalty.3 3 The legislative purpose, in accord with Furman, was to sin-
gle out a subclass of killers who, because of the brutality of their
crimes, society deemed deserving of death.34
In 1976, the Supreme Court upheld the first of these new statutes
in Gregg v. Georgia,35 thereby reinstating the death penalty as an ac-
ceptable sentence. The Georgia statute under which Gregg was con-
victed provided the sentencer with clear and objective standards that
the Court believed would place reasonable limitations on the sen-
tencer's discretion.36 Justices Marshall and Brennan, however, held
fast to the view that death is per se cruel and unusual punishment.3 7
4. Development of the Aggravating Circumstances Doctrine
Since Gregg, the Court has addressed the aggravating circum-
stances doctrine several times. Two of these decisions, Zant v. Ste-
phens38 and Godfrey v. Georgia,39 illustrate the Court's present
jurisprudence regarding this issue. Stephens concerned a Georgia de-
29 Steiker & Steiker, supra note 14, at 377 n.100 (citing NAACP Legal Defense & Educ.
Fund, Inc. 1994 DEATH Row USA REPORTER CURRENT SERViCE) (Summer 1994).
30 Steiker & Steiker, supra note 14, at 377 (citing Enmund, 458 U.S. at 789-92).
31 See MicHn.E MELTSNER, CRUEL & UNusuAL: THE SuiiREE COURT AND CAPrrAL PUN-
ISHMENT 306-09 (1973).
32 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 311 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
33 Id.
34 Steiker & Steiker, supra note 14, at 377-81.
35 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
36 Id. at 198.
37 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 358-59 (Marshall, J.,
concurring); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 277, 228-29 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at
231 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
38 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
39 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
19971 789
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fendant found guilty of beating, robbing, kidnapping and murdering
a man who interrupted Stephens and an accomplice as they were com-
mitting a burglary.40 Thejury found three statutory aggravators: prior
conviction of a capital felony; a substantial history of serious assaultive
convictions; and commission of the offense while an escapee from
jail.41 Stephens appealed, arguing first that Georgia's "nonweigh-
ing"42 scheme did not comport with Furman because it allowed too
much discretion to the sentencer.43 The Court disagreed, holding
that the nonweighing statutory scheme added some measure of objec-
tivity to the sentencer's decision-making process, which is all that
Furman required. 44
Second, Stephens argued that his sentence could not stand be-
cause after the jury imposed death, an appellate court deemed one of
the aggravating circumstances that supported the sentence was uncon-
stitutional.45 Specifically, while Stephens' case was on appeal, the
Georgia Supreme Court decided that "prior convictions for assault"
did not adequately narrow a sentencer's evaluation of a murder.46
Nevertheless, the Court allowed Stephens' sentence to stand.47
Though the jury instructions included a direction to consider the in-
valid circumstance in determining Stephens' sentence, the jury relied
on two other valid aggravating circumstances which were sufficient by
themselves to support the death sentence.48
A second Georgia case illustrates that even when the aggravator
passes constitutional muster, the court and the jury can misapply it.
In Godfrey v. Georgia, the defendant shot and killed his estranged wife
and mother-in-law.49 Both women died instantly from shotgun
blasts.50 During the trial, the prosecutor stated three times that these
murders involved no allegation of torture or aggravated battery.51
The jury, however, returned death sentences for both killings based
40 Stephens, 462 U.S. at 864-65.
41 Id. at 864. See GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b) (1978).
42 States are characterized as having a "weighing". scheme if the capital statute directs
the sentencer to (1) consider any aggravating circumstance(s) present in a case as having
more significance than any others; (2) place more weight to the presence of multiple ag-
gravating circumstances rather than a single aggravator; or (3) balance the aggravating
circumstances against the mitigating circumstances pursuant to any special standard. Ste-
phens; 462 U.S. at 873-74.
43 Id. at 874.
44 Id. at 879-80.
45 Id. at 880-84.
46 Arnold v. State, 224 S.E.2d 386, 391-92 (Ga. 1976).
47 Stephens, 462 U.S. at 890-91.
48 Id. at 866-67.
4q 446 U.S. 420, 424-25 (1980).
50 Id. at 425.
51 Id. at 426.
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on its finding that they were "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible
and inhuman."52 Both the trial judge and the Georgia Supreme
Court affirmed the sentence.53
The Supreme Court reversed.54 The Georgia statute, which the
Supreme Court had upheld against a constitutional challenge of
vagueness just four years earlier,55 allowed a death sentence if the of-
fense included the aggravating circumstance of being "outrageously
or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, de-
pravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim." 56 In the ear-
lier case, the Supreme Court ruled that this statutory aggravating
circumstance met the narrowing requirement of Furman5 7 as long as
the Georgia Supreme Court did not rely on overly broad construc-
tions of the language when applying it.-5
In Godfrey, however, the Supreme Court found that the Georgia
Supreme Court had not "implie [d] any inherent restraint on the arbi-
trary and capricious infliction of the death sentence" when it affirmed
that the offense was only "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or
inhuman."59 Because the sentencing instructions given by the trial
judge did not sufficiently channel the jury's efforts, "the jury's inter-
pretation of [the vileness aggravator defined in the statute could] only
be the subject of sheer speculation.160 The Court found that "standar-
dless and unchanneled imposition of death sentences in the uncon-
trolled discretion of a basically uninstructed jury in this case was in no
way cured by the affirmance of those sentences by the Georgia
Supreme Court."61
B. THE AKE ERROR
When a trial court denies an indigent defendant access to or
funds for certain expert assistance in a capital case, that court violates
the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the
52 Id.
53 Id. at 426-27.
54 Id. at 433.
55 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 202 (1976).
56 GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(7) (1978).
57 Furman required that each state narrow its capital punishment law in a manner that
avoided the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty by providing "a mean-
ingful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the penalty] is imposed from the
many cases in which it is not." Gregg; 428 U.S. at 188-89 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring)).
58 Id. at 202.
59 Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428-29. The jury expressly declined to find that Godfrey's mur-
der of his wife and mother-in-law involved torture or aggravated battery. Id. at 426.




Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Consti-
tution.62 A key part of the State's duty to provide a fair trial for indi-
gent defendants includes payment or arrangement for certain "basic
tools" that have become integral parts of every capital trial.63 In Ake v.
Oklahoma,64 the Court faced the question of whether an independent
psychiatrist is one of those basic tools when the defendant's sanity
might be an issue at trial.65 Glen Burton Ake, arrested for murdering
a couple, attempting to rape their 12-year-old daughter and wounding
both the daughter and the couple's son,66-behaved so bizarrely at
arraignment that the trial judge, sua sponte, ordered that he be ex-
amined by a psychiatrist.67 The psychiatrist diagnosed Ake as "a prob-
able paranoid schizophrenic," unable, at that time, to stand trial.68
Ake was committed to a state hospital where the chief forensic
psychiatrist (CFP) confirmed Ake's incompetency. 69 Six weeks later,
the CFP informed the court that drug therapy had resulted in Ake's
becoming competent.70 At no point during his stay in the state hospi-
tal did anyone evaluate Ake's mental condition at the time of the of-
fense. 71 When Ake's attorney requested state assistance in obtaining
such an evaluation-crucial information since Ake's sanity was his
only defense at trial-the court refused. 72 At trial, the court in-
structed the jury to presume Ake to be sane unless he presented ade-
quate evidence to raise a reasonable doubt on the issue. 73 Without a
psychiatric expert, Ake could not meet that burden. The jury found
Ake guilty on all counts. 74
Similarly, at sentencing Ake could not rebut the state psychia-
trist's opinions that he was a future danger.75 The jury called for
62 The Court has held that a trial is fundamentally unfair if it does not afford the de-
fendant due process of law. See, e.g., Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64 (1975) (per
curiam) (trial must be speedy); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (defendant must
have access to effective counsel).
63 The Court has stated that there is a difference between providing access to the court-
house steps and providing the meaningful basic tools for a defendant to launch a proper
defense. See Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971).
64 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
65 Id. at 70.
66 Id. at 88 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
67 Id. at 71.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 71-72.
71 Id. at 72.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 72-73.
74 Id. at 73.
75 Id.
792 [Vol. 87
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death sentences for each of the two murders.7 6
The Supreme Court reversed Ake's sentences, holding that a psy-
chiatrist is a basic tool of a defense. 77 Therefore, states have a consti-
tutional responsibility to provide an independent psychiatrist (or
funds for hiring one) to indigent defendants whose sanity will be an
issue at trial.78 In a special pretrial proceeding, a judge must decide
whether the defendant can legitimately raise an insanity defense at
trial.7 9
The Court imposed this special pretrial procedure on the states
after balancing the private and governmental interests at stake.80
First, the Court held that the private interest in getting an accurate
decision was "almost uniquely compelling" in a capital case. 8' Con-
versely, the Court found that the government's fiscal interest was mini-
mal.82 Forty other states and the federal government already had
statutes requiring this type of expert assistance for indigent defend-
ants, and those jurisdictions had not found the costs unbearable. 83
Further, the state should gladly pursue any effort that aids in the
search for truth in criminal prosecutions since the state's goal is to
punish the true offender.84 Finally, the Court underscored its analysis
by pointing out that denying something as simple as psychiatric assist-
ance created an unacceptable risk in a capital trial.85 If sanity is an
issue, the defendant is entitled to have an expert explain his condition
to the factfinder at both the guilt and sentencing phases of trial.86
Ake v. Oklahoma has been the source of considerable controversy
and confusion. For example, some commentators have criticized the
Court for requiring a pre-trial proceeding where the judge decides
76 Id.
77 Id. at 69-70. Justice Rehnquist dissented. See id. at 87-92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
After setting out the rest of the details of Ake's crimes, Justice Rehnquist pointed out that
the Oklahoma statute treats psychiatric testimony as a question of fact. Id. at 92 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting). Unless the expert commits perjury, the testimony about the facts of
the defendant's mental condition should be the same no matter which side hires the psy-
chiatrist. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
78 Id. at 74.
79 Id. at 82-83.
80 Ake, 470 U.S. at 77 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
81 Id. at 78.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 78 & n.4.
84 Id. at 79.
85 Id. at 79-83.
86 Id. at 83. There is some disagreement as to whether the Mathews formulation is prop-
erly applied to questions of deprivation of liberty without due process of law. Compare
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 59-60 (1981) (Stevens,J., dissenting)
(arguing that protecting liberty from deprivation by the state without due process is "price-
less" and therefore the Mathews formulation should not be applied) with Schall v. Martin,
467 U.S. 253, 275-81 (1984) (applying Mathews to questions of deprivation of liberty).
1997]
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the merits of the defendant's insanity plea before the defendant has
even seen a psychiatrist.8 7 Other legal analysts, however, have stated
that Ake is merely a good start and that indigent defendants have a
right to whatever expert assistance is necessary to rebut the prosecu-
tion's case.88
C. THE STANDARDS FOR HARMLESS ERROR REVIEW
The harmless error doctrine allows a reviewing court to affirm a
conviction in spite of a trivial, formal or merely academic error that
occurred at trial.8 9 Though sometimes constitutional errors are such
that they can be subject to harmless error analysis,9° most are not.9 1
Brecht v. Abrahamson9 2 identified two classes of constitutional errors-
"trial" and "structural"-and established the bright line that separates
them. In Brecht, the Court described trial and structural errors as
follows:
[Trial] error occur[s] during the presentation of the case to the jury,
and is amenable to harmless-error analysis because it may be quantita-
tively assessed in the context of other evidence to determine its effect on
the trial .... At the other end of the spectrum of constitutional errors lie
structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy
analysis by "harmless-error" standards. The existence of such defects-
deprivation of the right to counsel, for example-requires automatic re-
versal of the conviction because they infect the entire trial process.93
Once a reviewing court decides that harmless error analysis is ap-
propriate, its standard for performing the review depends on whether
the case is before it on direct or collateral appeal. When the review is
direct-for example, when a state supreme court reviews the decision
of a lower state court-the reviewing court must be able to declare
that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.94 The court must
87 See, e.g., Pamela Casey & Ingo Keilitz, An Evaluation of Mental Health Expert Assistance
Provided to Indigent Criminal Defendants: Organization, Administration, and Fiscal Management,
34 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rav. 19 (1989);John M. West, Note, Expert Services and the Indigent Defend-
ant: The Constitutional Mandate ofAke v. Oklahoma, 84 MicH. L. REv. 1326 (1986).
88 See infra Part V.
89 State v. Michelli, 301 So. 2d 577, 579 (La. 1974); State v. Johnson, 463 P.2d 205, 206
(Wa. 1969).
90 Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986) (holding that harmless error analysis is inap-
propriate when the error thwarts a defendant's "opportunity to put on evidence and make
[an] argument" to support his claim or otherwise affects "the composition of the record").
91 See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991) (stating that violation of
right to counsel cannot be harmless); Rose, 478 U.S. at 577-79 (holding that the deprivation
of right to trial by jury cannot be harmless).
92 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
93 Id. at 620-30 (internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted).
94 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967). Cf Kotteakos v. United States, 328
U.S. 750, 764 (1946).
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resolve any state or federal constitutional issues according to this
standard. 5
There is a less onerous standard for collateral review of trial er-
rors. Collateral review occurs when a federal court reviews a state
courtjudgment to determine whether application of the state's law to
this case violated any federal rights. 96 The reviewing court's standard
is whether the trial error had a substantial and injurious effect or influ-
ence on the verdict.97 The policy behind this lower standard for federal
courts reflects the Supreme Court's concern "that granting federal
collateral relief upon a mere 'reasonable possibility' that the error
contributed to the verdict would be inconsistent with the historic pur-
pose of habeas corpus to afford relief only to those who have been
'grievously wronged' by society."98
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1971, Lem Davis Tuggle was sentenced to twenty years impris-
onment at Virginia's Mecklenberg Correctional Facility for the second
degree murder of a seventeen-year-old girl. 99 In early 1983, the state
granted Tuggle parole for that crime. 100 Four months later, on May
28, 1983, Tuggle metJessie Geneva Havens, a fifty-two year-old grand-
mother at an American Legion Hall dance. 10 When the dance ended
at 1:00 a.m., Tuggle offered to drive Havens home. 0 2
A short time later, a Virginia State Trooper pulled Tuggle over
for weaving on the highway.'03 The trooper observed a "large, mid-
dle-aged, white female" sitting next to Tuggle.' 0 4 After passing a so-
briety check, Tuggle continued on his way.' 05 By 6:00 p.m. on May 29,
Havens' family notified the police that she was missing.'0 6
95 Tuggle VI, 79 F.3d 1386, 1392-93 (4th Cir. 1996).
96 Brech4 507 U.S. at 638.
97 Id.; Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 251-56 (1988). In Satterwhite the Akeviolation
was not at issue. The Court analyzed whether a reviewing court can make an intelligent
judgment about whether the erroneously admitted psychiatric testimony might have af-
fected a capital sentencing jury or, if the scope of a violation "cannot be discerned from
the record" so that "any inquiry into its effect on the outcome of the case would be purely
speculative" and the error could not be harmless. Satterwhite; 486 U.S. at 256.
98 Tuggle V, 79 F.3d at 1392-93 (citing Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637).
99 Vrginia Murder Case Remanded, RoANoKE TiMEs & WORm.D NEws, Oct. 31, 1995, at CI.
100 Tuggie I, 323 S.E.2d 539, 544 (Va. 1984).








Four days later, State Trooper R.M. Freeman pulled Tuggle over
because an armed robbery witness had described Tuggle's black
pickup truck. 10 7 When Freeman asked Tuggle if he had been near a
certain gas station, 10 8 Tuggle responded, "Yes, I robbed it, the
money's in my pocket, the gun's in the truck."109 Freeman seized a
.25 caliber automatic weapon from the truck and then took Tuggle to
the Pulaski County Sheriff's Office." l0 During that ride, Tuggle stated
that he was "connected with a missing person's report relating to Jes-
sie Havens" and that he would talk to Smyth County authorities
later. I'
When a Smyth County investigator arrived to question Tuggle
later that morning, Tuggle stated that he did not know what had hap-
pened to Havens, but he knew where the investigator could find her
body. 1 2 He specifically stated, "From past experience, I would like to
talk to an attorney. I'll probably tell you the full story later."""
Later that morning, the investigator found Havens' body in the
place Tuggle described. 1 4 Havens' clothes were ripped and partially
removed from her body." 5 In addition to a fatal gunshot wound to
her chest, Havens had a number of bruises and abrasions on her face,
neck, arms and genitals. 116 Ballistics tests identified the gun Trooper
Freeman had seized from Tuggle's truck as the same gun that fired
the bullet that killed Havens." 7 There was also a bite mark on
Havens' right breast that a forensic odontologist determined with
medical certainty that Tuggle inflicted while Havens was still alive." 8
Though there was no semen or sperm in Havens' vagina, there was
evidence of penetration or manipulation. 19 There was semen in her
rectum.' 20
Tuggle was charged with the willful, deliberate and premeditated
murder of Jessie Geneva Havens during the commission of, or subse-










117 Id. at 543-44.
118 Id. at 544. The reliability of bitemarks has been questioned by some experts. See, e.g.,
ANDRE A. MOENSSENS & FRED E. INBAU, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 650-58 (2d
ed. 1978).
119 Tuggle 1, 323 S.E.2d at 544.
120 Id.
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quent to, rape.' 2 ' Tuggle and his counsel requested a psychiatric ex-
amination.122 They made this request because Tuggle had been
frequently evaluated during his previous incarceration, including a
1971 evaluation for mental disorders. 123 The trial judge initially de-
nied the request but later granted a subsequent motion for an exami-
nation based on the same grounds. 124
Prior to the exam, Tuggle signed a form indicating that he under-
stood his rights, including the right to have his lawyer present during
questioning, and that he was waiving these rights voluntarily. 25 Dr.
Ryan, a forensic psychiatrist, and Dr. Centor, a clinical psychologist,
performed the evaluation.' 26 They reported that Tuggle was fit to
stand trial and that he was sane at the time of the crime. 27 Though
the doctors also reached a conclusion about Tuggle's future danger-
ousness, they withheld this opinion since the court had not asked for
it.128
When the doctors presented the results of this examination, Tug-
gle requested state funds for a subsequent exam by an independent
psychiatrist of his counsel's choosing.' 29 The trial court refused to
provide funds for another expert or to allow Tuggle's state-appointed
attorneys to pay for the analysis themselves.' 30
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
At a bifurcated trial"s' in early 1984, ajury found Tuggle guilty132
of Jessie Havens' murder and sentenced him to death.'3 3 Tuggle
promptly appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court,'34 raising several
121 Id. at 543; VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(e) (Michie 1996).
122 Tuggle HI, 334 S.E.2d 838, 840 (Va. 1985).
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Tuggle , 323 S.E.2d at 551-52.
126 Tuggle , 334 S.E.2d at 840.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Court Defines Death Penalty Factors, UPI, Oct. 30, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, UPI File.
130 Tuggle v. Thompson, 854 F. Supp. 1229, 1233 (W.D. Va. 1994) [hereinafter TuggLe
IM.
131 For capital cases, Virginia provides a two-stage trial. The factfinder first decides the
defendant's guilt, then sets a sentence. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-264.3, 19.2-264.4
(Michie 1995).
132 The state charged Tuggle with the willful, deliberate and premeditated murder of
Ms. Havens during the commission of, or subsequent to, rape, pursuant to section 18.2-
31(e) of the Virginia Code. See Tuggle W, 79 F.3d 1386, 1394 (4th Cir. 1996).
133 Tuggle , 323 S.E.2d at 543.
134 Id. Any defendant sentenced to death in Virginia receives an automatic appeal to
the state supreme court. See VA. CODE ANN. § 17-110.1 (Michie 1996). As this automatic
appeal was pending, Tuggle and five other death row inmates staged the largest death row
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issues.1 35 Despite finding errors in the original trial, the Virginia
Supreme Court ruled that none of the errors warranted reversal and
that the sentence could stand.136 On May 13, 1985, the United States
Supreme Court granted Tuggle's petition for certiorari.' 37 The Court
vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Virginia Supreme
Court for further consideration in light of Ake v. Oklahoma,138 which
the Court had decided shortly after the state court upheld Tuggle's
sentence.
139
In September 1985, the Virginia Supreme Court again consid-
ered Tuggle's case. 140 Following a lengthy review of Ake, the court
escape in U.S. history when, posing as guards, they walked out of the Mecklenburg Correc-
tional Center. Authorities recaptured all six within a month and all six have been exe-
cuted. Laura LaFay, High Court Sends Back Case Against Vrginia Killer, THE VIRGINIAN-PII.OT
(Norfolk), Oct. 31, 1995, at Al; Virginia Murder Case Remanded, RoANoKE TIMES & WORLD
NEWS, Oct. 31, 1995, at C1.
135 Tugge 1, 323 S.E.2d at 544-54. On appeal from the pre-trial and guilt trial phases,
Tuggle claimed the following events and actions were improper:
Denial of request for a second psychiatric evaluation;
Denial of motion for change of venue;
Denial of request to sequester the jury;
Prejudicial voir dire errors;
Prejudicial effect of the State Trooper's testimony regarding the separate charges of
robbery;
Prejudicial or incorrect jury instructions;
Insufficient evidence to support the rape charge;
Failure to disqualify an ill juror; and
Conduct of the Commonwealth's attorney.
Id.
The claims raised concerning the penalty trial and sentence review were:
Psychiatric exam performed outside counsel's presence;
Prejudicial or improper jury instructions;
Prejudicial factors allowed to influence the sentence; and
Sentence excessive and disproportionate to sentences imposed on other defendants in
similar cases.
Id. These claims were supported in part by the fact that the local papers published a
number of articles prior to the trial that reported, among other things, that Tuggle's previ-
ous conviction for second-degree murder had included a rape charge and that Tuggle was
an uncharged suspect in the rape of a 15-year-old girl. There were also instances of report-
ers and Sheriffs office employees contacting thejury panel about another criminal trial on
which they served shortly before their acceptance onto Tuggle's panel. Finally, six mem-
bers of the jury admitted to reading and remembering details from the newspaper ac-
counts, and five of the jurors admitted that the Sheriffs Department or the media had
contacted them to elicit an explanation of the reason for their lenient verdict in the other
criminal case. Tuggle III, 854 F. Supp. at 1233-34.
136 Tuggle 1, 323 S.E.2d at 554.
137 Tuggle v. Virginia, 471 U.S. 1096 (1985).
138 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (holding that the Constitution requires a state
to provide indigent defendants with psychiatric assistance when sanity is a significant factor
at trial).
135 Tugge 471 U.S. at 1096.
140 Tugg/e I, 334 S.E.2d 838 (Va. 1985).
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distinguished Ake's case from Tuggle's on the grounds that Tuggle's
sanity at the time of the crime was not a significant factor in his trial,
so there was no error in the guilty verdict. 41 However, the court did
hold the denial of a second psychiatric evaluation to be an Ake error
in the penalty phase.' 42 The court deemed this error moot because it
invalidated only the future dangerousness' 43 element, not the vileness
element. 44 Citing Zant v. Stephens,145 the court reasoned that the
death sentence could stand because an aggravating circumstance re-
mained.' 46 Two months later, the court denied Tuggle's petition for
rehearing. 47
In June 1986, the United States Supreme Court denied Tuggle's
second petition for certiorari. 148 Following this denial, Tuggle filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of Smyth
County, Virginia, 49 a petition for appeal in the Virginia Supreme
Court,150 and a third petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court.15 1
In 1994, Tuggle filed his first appeal in federal court.1 52 In June
1994, the United States District Court for the Western District of Vir-
ginia granted Tuggle's petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on
141 Id. at 843.
142 Id. at 846. Apparently, this is the only reported instance where the Virginia Attorney
General admitted constitutional error in a capital case. Tuggle XI, 854 F. Supp. 1229, 1233,
n.4 (W.D. Va. 1994).
143 In Virginia, the death penalty shall not be imposed unless the State proves beyond a
reasonable doubt: (1) future dangerousness (i.e., "that there is a probability based upon
evidence of the prior history of the defendant or of the circumstances surrounding the
commission of the offense of which he is accused that he would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society.. .") and/or (2) vile-
ness (i.e., that the defendant's conduct in committing the offense was "outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or aggra-
vated battery to the victim.") VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(C) (Michie 1995).
144 Tuggle , 334 S.E.2d at 846.
145 Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983) (stating that when a jury reaches separate
findings on statute-defined aggravating circumstances, any one of which could support a
death sentence, subsequent invalidation of one of those circumstances does not invalidate
the sentence).
146 Tuggle H, 334 S.E.2d. at 845-46.
147 Tuggle I, 854 F. Supp. at 1233.
148 Tuggle v. Virginia, 478 U.S. 1010 (1986). Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Mar-
shall, dissented, stating that the death penalty is a cruel and unusual punishment and is
prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. Id. (Brennan,
J., and Marshall, J., dissenting).
149 Tugg/ e !I, 854 F. Supp. at 1233. This petition was dismissed without evidentiary hear-
ing in March, 1991. Id.
150 Id. This petition was dismissed without published order in November, 1991. Id.
151 See Tuggle v. Bair, 112 S. Ct. 1681 (1992) (denying petition for certiorari).
152 See Tuggle/ I, 854 F. Supp. at 1229.
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ten constitutional errors. 153 The district court vacated Tuggle's con-
viction and sentence, ordered the state court to retry his case within
six months, and, concurrently, granted the state's motion to stay the
retrial and release pending its appeal to the Fourth Circuit. 5 4
The Fourth Circuit heard Tuggle's case in February 1995.155 Re-
versing the district court, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case with
instructions to dismiss the petition for writ of habeas corpus' 56 and
granted Tuggle a stay of execution pending his appeal to the Supreme
Court.157 In a per curiam opinion filed September 14, 1995, the
Supreme Court said that the Fourth Circuit had wrongly interpreted
the governing procedure of Barefoot v. Estelle'58 when it automatically
granted a stay of execution to a capital defendant until that defendant
could file a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.159 Accord-
ingly, the Court granted the Virginia's application to vacate the stay of
execution. 160 However, despite the assignment of error to the Fourth
Circuit's interpretation of Barefoot, on September 21, 1995, ChiefJus-
tice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, granted Tuggle's stay of execu-
tion pending disposition of his latest petition for writ of certiorari.' 6'
On October 30, 1995, in a per curiam decision reached without
hearing oral argument, the Supreme Court vacated Tuggle's sentence
and remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit for further proceedings
to determine whether the Ake error was harmless in the penalty phase
of the trial. 162
On remand, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the Ake error was harm-
less. 163 The Supreme Court denied Tuggle's petition for certiorari to
153 Id. at 1247-48. See supra note 135, for a summary of the general issues raised.
154 Tuggle v. Thompson, 57 F.3d 1356, 1359 (4th Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Tuggle IV].
155 Id. at 1356.
156 Id. at 1374.
157 Netherland v. Tuggle, 116 S. Ct. 4, 5 (1995).
158 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983). Barefoot requires that there must be "a rea-
sonable probability that four members of the Court would consider the underlying issue
sufficiently meritorious for the grant of certiorari... ; there must be a significant possibil-
ity of reversal of the lower court's decision; and there must be a likelihood that irreparable
harm will result if that decision is not stayed" in order for the Supreme Court to grant a
stay of execution. Id. at 895.
159 Tugg/, 116 S. Ct. at 5.
160 Id. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsberg, dissented, stating that despite the
Fourth Circuit's failure to include a discussion of the three-part Barefoot inquiry in its opin-
ion, there was no reason for the Court to assume that the analysis was not conducted. Id. at
5-6 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer concurred in part with this reasoning. Id. at 6
(opinion of Breyer, J.). Justice Souter, too, would deny the application. Id. at 6 (opinion
of Souter, J.).
161 Tuggle v. Netherland, 116 S. Ct. 38 (1995).
162 Tuggle V 116 S. Ct. 283, 285-86 (1995) (per curiam).
163 Tugge VT, 79 F.3d 1386, 1392 (4th Cir. 1996).
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review this decision.Y6 Tuggle was executed on December 12,
1996.165
IV. SUMMARY OF THE OPINION
A. THE PER CURIAM OPINION
The per curiam opinion begins with a review of the rule from
Zant v. Stephens'66 which states "that a death sentence supported by
multiple aggravating circumstances need not always be set aside if one
aggravator is foumd to be invalid."167 First, the Court stated that this
rule would not apply in weighing states. 168 Then, the Court noted
that the Virginia Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit both had in-
terpreted Zant to mean that, in nonweighing states, as long as there is
one valid aggravating factor, the death sentence will stand "regardless
of the reasons for which another aggravating factor may have been
found to be invalid."169
Next, the Court reviewed the procedural history of Tuggle's
case.' 70 First, the Court noted that Virginia's capital punishment stat-
ute required Tuggle's sentencing jury to decide whether the prosecu-
tor had proven the aggravating factors of future dangerousness or
vileness. 17 1 If neither were present, then the jury should impose life
imprisonment. 172 If one or both were present, then the jury had the
discretion to sentence the defendant to death.' 7- Next, the Court re-
viewed Ake v. Oklahoma,'7 4 a case decided just months after Tuggle lost
his first appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court. The Court stated the
Ake holding: when, in a death penalty sentencing, the prosecutor of-
fers psychiatric testimony as to an indigent defendant's future danger-
ousness, due process guarantees the defendant's right to the
assistance of a state-provided independent psychiatrist. 7- Rounding
164 Tuggle VW, 117 S. Ct. 237 (1996).
165 Recaptured Murderer Executed in Wirginia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1996, at B1I.
166 Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
167 Tuggle V 116 S. Ct. at 284 (citing Zant, 462 U.S. at 886-88).
168 Id. at 284. See supra note 42 for definition of weighing and nonweighing statutory
schemes.
169 Tuggle V, 116 S. Ct. at 284.
170 Id. at 284-85.
171 Id. at 284 n.I.
172 Id.
173 Id. Tuggle's jury found both factors present. Id. at 284.
174 470 U.S. 68 (1985). Akewas also the basis for the Supreme Court's first reversal and
remand of Tuggle's case. Tuggle v. Virginia, 417 U.S. 1096, 1096 (1985).
175 Tuggle V, 116 S. Ct. at 284. Tuggle did not receive such assistance and, on remand
from the Supreme Court, the Virginia Supreme Court invalidated the future dangerous-
ness aggravator. Toge II, 334 S.E.2d 838, 845-46 (Va. 1985). However, the Virginia court
upheld the sentence, reasoning that, under Zant, the vileness factor was sufficient. See
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out the factual and legal background for its analysis, the Court quoted
the portion of the Fourth Circuit's opinion that applied Zant to Tug-
gle's case.1 76
The Court disagreed with the circuit court's analysis of Zant.177
According to the Court, Zant involved a statutory aggravating circum-
stance that was struck down as unconstitutional because it did not
"provide an adequate basis for distinguishing a murder case in which
the death penalty may be imposed from those cases in which such a
penalty may not be imposed. The underlying evidence [presented to sup-
port the factor was] nevertheless fully admissible at the sentencing
phase." 178 Therefore, despite the elimination of an aggravating fac-
tor, the death sentence rested on firm ground.179
The Court stated that Tuggle's Ake error did not rest on admissi-
ble evidence like the error in Zant did.180 Furthermore, the Court
disagreed with both the Virginia court's and the Fourth Circuit's as-
sumption that the improper psychiatric evidence had no influence on
the jury's ultimate decision. 181 The Court surmised that Tuggle's in-
ability to challenge the state's psychiatric evidence and mitigate its im-
pact may have increased the persuasiveness of that evidence for the
jury.a82 Furthermore, the Court asserted that the lower courts had
misinterpreted Zant to mean that the presence of any valid aggravator
excuses constitutional error in the admission or exclusion of evi-
dence. 183 Therefore, the lower courts should have looked to Johnson
V. Mississippi 84 as precedent for Tuggle's case, rather than looking to
Zant.185 The Court did point out that Zant provided the basis for
harmless error review of Tuggle's case. 186
In its conclusion, the Court addressed the fact that when the state
court found the Ake error, it had not considered what remedy was
appropriate for that error.187 Acknowledging that it lacked jurisdic-
tion to make an initial ruling as to the harmlessness of an issue,' 88 the
supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text.
176 Tugge V, 116 S. Ct. at 285.
177 Id.
178 Id. (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885-86 (1983) (emphasis added)).





184 486 U.S. 578 (1988) (stating that Zant will not support a death sentence when materi-
ally inaccurate evidence was allowed to play a part in the jury's decision).
185 116 S. Ct. at 285.
186 See supra Part II.A.4 for a discussion of the Zant doctrine.
187 116 S. Ct. at 285.
188 Id.
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Court vacated the Fourth Circuit's judgment upholding the sentence
and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings to deter-
mine whether the Ake error was harmless. 189
B. JUSTICE SCALIA'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Scalia concurred in Tuggle V, calling this a "simple case" of
inadmissible evidence. 190 Citing Satterwhite v. Texas,'"" Justice Scalia
stated that the jury considered improper evidence, and, accordingly,
the Virginia Supreme Court should have decided whether that "con-
stitutional error contributed to the jury's decision to impose the sen-
tence of death."'9 2 Since the Virginia court did not consider this
issue, Justice Scalia concluded that the Fourth Circuit improperly de-
nied habeas. 9 3 Justice Scalia thus agreed to vacate and remand the
case to the Fourth Circuit, but he would have instructed the Fourth
Circuit to review the case under the Brecht'94 harmless error
standard. 9 5
Justice Scalia asserted that Tuggle's case has persisted due to Tug-
gle's transformation of a simple question-"might the constitutional
error have affected the decision of the capital sentencingjury?"-into
a difficult question-"can a death sentence based in part on an 'inva-
lid aggravating circumstance' still stand?"' 9 6 Justice Scalia accused the
Virginia Supreme Court of answering the second question, "the wrong
question," because it assumed that a reference to Zant provided an
easy basis for the decision.' 97 Justice Scalia noted that the district
court and Fourth Circuit subsequently had focused their inquiries on
the result of the Virginia court's mistaken result.198 Furthermore, Jus-
tice Scalia noted that even though the Supreme Court's current deci-
sion recognized the misplaced application of Zant to this case, it
perpetuated "the 'invalid aggravating circumstance' camouflage that
petitioner has added to a straightforward inadmissible-evidence
189 Id. at 285-86.
190 Id. at 286 (Scalia, J., concurring).
191 Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 259-60 (1988) (finding that upon application of
harmless error analysis to the unconstitutional use of psychiatrist's testimony at a sentenc-
ing hearing, the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
192 Tuggle V, 116 S. Ct at 286 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
193 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
I94 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1998). There is a discrepancy in citing both
Brecht and Satterwhite here, since the cases call for conflicting standards of review when
doing harmless error analysis. See supra Part II.C.
195 Tuggle V, 116 S. Ct. at 286 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
196 Id. (ScaliaJ., concurring).
1947 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).






When the Supreme Court remanded Tuggle's case to the Fourth
Circuit, it directed the lower court to decide whether the Ake error in
Tuggle's sentencing proceeding was harmless.200 The Fourth Circuit
correctly concluded that the unrebutted psychiatric testimony did not
have a "substantial and injurious effect or influence on the verdict," so
the verdict could stand.201
The basis of the Fourth Circuit's analysis was straightforward.
Tuggle's jury imposed a sentence after it found two aggravating cir-
cumstances: future dangerousness and heinousness. The jury heard
that Jessie Havens made a terrible mistake when she accepted a ride
from Tuggle.20 2 Tuggle raped her. He sodomized her. He hit her.
He bit her. While face to face with her, he put a gun to her chest and
shot her. Then, he dumped her ravaged body over an embankment
and drove off to rob a gas station at gunpoint. 203 For the jury, these
facts satisfied the requirements of the heinousness aggravator.20 4
But the jury also found the future dangerousness aggravator.
Part of the testimony about this element came from a state psychiatrist
who said that Tuggle posed a continuing threat to society.20 5 Because
there was no expert rebuttal, due to the defendant's inability to hire
an expert and the state's refusal to provide one, this was an Ake er-
ror.20 6 On his final appeal the defendant asked the Fourth Circuit
and the Supreme Court to rule that an Ake error should never be sub-
ject to harmless error analysis because it is a structural error in the
trial.2 0 7 Both courts rejected the argument. 208
This Note argues that the facts and circumstances of Tuggle's
case clearly show that an Ake error is not a structural error, but merely
a trial error. The Fourth Circuit's harmless error analysis was appro-
priate and yielded the right result.
199 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
200 Tuggle V, 116 S. Ct. at 285-86.
201 Tugge V, 79 F.3d 1386, 1392 (4th Cir. 1996).
202 Tuggle , 323 S.E.2d 539, 543 (Va. 1984).
203 Id.
204 Tuggle W, 79 F.3d at 1390.
205 Id. at 1391.
206 Tuggle V, 116 S. Ct. at 285.
207 See Appellant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11-20, Tuggle v. Netherland, 117 S.
Ct. 237 (1996) (No. 96-5364).
208 Tuggle V, 116 S. CL at 285; Tuggle V, 79 F.3d at 1392.
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A. THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING HARMLESS ERROR REVIEW FOR
CAPITAL SENTENCING ERRORS
In his last appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Tuggle argued that Ake
errors are structural and compel automatic reversal.209 This argu-
ment has its roots in three sources: the Ake opinion itself; the general
belief that no constitutional error in a capital trial could be harmless;
and the specific assertion that Ake errors are not harmless because of
the identity of the expert involved.
In the Ake opinion,Justice Marshall concluded that the state has a
constitutional duty to provide a psychiatrist to an indigent defendant
under certain circumstances. 2 10 The policy behind this decision was
twofold. First, Justice Marshall found that there was already a wide-
spread acceptance for this rule.2 1 1 More than forty states and the fed-
eral law required that mentally ill indigent defendants receive
psychiatric assistance for their trial.212 Marshall saw this majority rule
as indicating both support for the requirement's status as fundamen-
tal to a fair trial and evidence that it was not an unworkable financial
or procedural burden.2 1 3
Second, Marshall looked at the pervasiveness of psychiatry in
American law.214 By the time Ake reached the Supreme Court in 1985,
it was very common for psychiatrists to testify.21 5 The Court noted
that psychiatric issues are so complex that it becomes crucial for a
defendant to put a psychiatrist on the stand and explain behaviors to
the jury.2 16 Accordingly, psychiatric testimony can become a "virtual
necessity if an insanity plea is to have any chance of success."2 17 This
pervasiveness is exemplified by the willingness of any party who has
access to a psychiatrist to use that expert 2 18 Justice Marshall con-
cluded thatjury members could be so swayed by hearing a psychiatrist
that only another equivalent professional would be able to shed doubt
on what that expert said.2 1 9 Without an expert of his own, a defend-
ant is deprived of his constitutional right to a fair trial.220
209 Appellant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11-20, Tuggle (No. 96-5364).
210 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 86-87 (1985).
211 Id. at 78-79.
212 Id. at 78 & n.4.
213 Id. at 78.
214 Id. at 80.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 80-82 (quoting Martin K Gardner, The Myth of the Psychiatric Expert-Some Com-
ments Concerning Criminal Responsibility and the Decline of the Age of Therapy, 2 L. & PSYCHOIL
RE,. 99, 113-14 (1976)).
217 Id. at 81 (quoting Gardner, supra note 216, at 11--14).
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 83-84.
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Some commentators would take this analysis one step further be-
cause of the finality of capital punishment. These legal analysts pro-
pose that any constitutional error in capital sentencing proceedings
requires reversal per se. Professor Linda E. Carter, for example,
reached this conclusion by considering how the jury reaches its ver-
dict. 22 ' When the jury reviews aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances to decide whether to impose death, the record cannot reflect
what weight those factors carried or how the jurors' personal beliefs
affected the equation.222 Professor Carter thus characterizes the
deliberation as a "value-laden" inquiry. 223 However, she calls harmless
error review a "fact-laden" process driven by a record which does not
adequately account for the impact of jury values.224 Thus, Professor
Carter concludes that sentencing decision errors meet the standard
for per se reversal since they are "unquantifiable and indeter-
minate."225
One commentator applied this general analysis to the specific is-
sue of the Ake error. Michael J. Lorenger argues that Ake errors
should be per se reversible because of the policy justifications behind
the rule in Ake.226 Ifjurors are, indeed, so swayed by psychiatric testi-
mony, then there is a structural error in the trial.227 In particular,
221 Linda E. Carter, Harmless Error in the Penalty Phase of a Capital Case: A Doctrine Misun-
derstood and Misapplied, 28 GA. L. REv. 125 (1993). See also James C. Scoville, Comment,
Deadly Mistakes: Harmless Error in Capital Sentencing, 54 U. CHi. L. REv. 740 (1987) (conclud-
ing that harmless error analysis is inappropriate for errors made in capital sentencing
when the jury weighs aggravating and mitigating circumstances).
222 Carter, supra note 221, at 127.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 275 (1993).
226 See MichaelJ. Lorenger, Note, Ake v. Oklahoma and Harmless Error: The Case for a Per
Se Rule of Reversal, 81 VA. L. REv. 521 (1995). For the purposes of his analysis, Lorenger
limited the Ake holding to the narrow facts of the case: denial of psychiatric expert assist-
ance, in a capital trial, to a defendant who makes the initial showing that his sanity will be
an issue at trial. Though some commentators have argued that there is also Ake error
when a court denies other types of expert assistance in other types of trials, the courts have
not yet extended the reach of this particular right. See, e.g., Ex parte Grayson, 479 So. 2d
76 (Ala. 1985) (holding that an indigent defendant does not have a right to a state-funded
pathologist); Plunkett v. State, 719 P.2d 834 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986) (holding that there is
no constitutional right to a bloodstain expert).
227 Lorenger, supra note 226, at 560-61. The Court has classified errors as structural,
"where the entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end is obviously affected," and
trial when it can be "quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in
order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Ari-
zona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 308-10 (1991). The applicable standard in Fulminante
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt," see id., was the Chapman standard. In Tuggle's case,
a collateral habeas review, the proper standard is the Brecht standard of whether the error
had "substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury's verdict." See Brecht v. Abra-
hamson, 507 U.S. 619, 627 (1993); Tugge V, 116 S. Ct. 283, 284 (1996),
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Lorenger asserts that when a defendant does not rebut psychiatric tes-
timony with an expert of his own, the jury could discern an acquies-
cence in the state's psychiatric conclusions. 228
Although the case for extremely careful review of errors in capital
trials is beyond argument, Tuggle's case proves that there is no need
to treat those errors as structural; appellate courts do have the tools to
review those errors and reach fair decisions.
Tuggle's sentencing proceeding clearly contained an Ake error.
Prior to trial, the judge agreed that Tuggle's motion requesting a psy-
chiatric evaluation had merit.229 Therefore, Tuggle met the threshold
burden required by Ake, and he should have had his own psychiatrist
on his defense team. The Supreme Court acknowledged this and di-
rected the Fourth Circuit to assess this issue.230 There are two reasons
why this was the proper procedural approach: first, Ake errors are trial
errors and, second, the court had a full record for evaluating the im-
pact of this particular Ake error.
First, there is a fundamental difference between Ake errors and
errors already classified by the Supreme Court as structural. Struc-
tural errors impose a total disability on the defendant and'thus are
presumed to infect every aspect of the trial.231 The right to counsel,
for example, is guaranteed by the Constitution regardless of the case
or the defendant 232 This right attaches automatically with no special
showing required of the defendant. Access to a psychiatrist, however,
is not automatic. The Ake rule requires the defendant to meet an ini-
tial burden before that right attaches.233 Such a conditional right
"[cannot] fairly be defined as basic to the structure of a constitutional
trial."234 The Ake error in Tuggle's case is even more readily defined
as a trial error, rather than a structural error, since it occurred only in
the sentencing proceeding.2 35
Second, in this particular case, the evidence supports the Fourth
Circuit's decision to uphold the sentence. By the time the Fourth Cir-
cuit performed its final review of Tuggle's case, the heinousness evi-
dence was not at issue. Tuggle did not just kill Jessie Havens. He
brutalized and probably terrorized her. It is irresponsible to suggest
228 Lorenger, supra note 226, at 546. See also Ake, 470 U.S. at 82-83.
229 Tuggleff, 334 S.E.2d 838, 840 (Va. 1985).
2-0 Tuggle V 116 S. Ct. at 285.
231 Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638.
232 See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991).
233 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).
2-4 Brewer v. Reynolds, 51 F.3d 1519, 1529 (10th Cir. 1995), cet. denied, 116 S. Ct. 936
(1996) (quoting Starr v. Lockhart, 23 F.3d 1280, 1281 (8th Cir. 1994) (alteration in
original)).
235 Tuggle V 116 S. Ct. at 285.
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that the jury acted irrationally when it characterized this as horrible,
inhuman torture, the product of a depraved mind, and/or an aggra-
vated battery.23 6 Since there is no degree of heinousness in nonweigh-
ing states like Virginia, this aggravator's impact is neither lessened nor
heightened in any way because of other aggravators or mitigators.
But, as the Supreme Court stated, the error in Tuggle's case could not
be dismissed solely because this factor was unimpeached.2 37 The ap-
pellate court had to assess whether the Ake error made the entire trial
so unfair as to give rise to a constitutional right to a reversal.238
As the Fourth Circuit recognized, there were actually two compo-
nents to the Ake error in this case. The first was the improper admis-
sion of Dr. Centor's testimony to support the future dangerous
aggravator.23 9 To establish future dangerousness,
the state introduced: (1) evidence that Tuggle murdered Havens while
on parole for murder; (2) evidence of Tuggle's criminal history, which
in addition to another murder, included escape and armed robbery; and
(3) the psychiatric testimony of Dr. Centor, a licensed clinical psycholo-
gist, who testified that Tuggle demonstrated a high probability of future
dangerousness.240
Dr. Centor's testimony, which was improperly admitted evidence, was
subject to harmless error analysis under both Fourth Circuit and
Supreme Court precedent.2 4' Both courts have held that a reviewing
body can assess the impact that such testimony had on the verdict by
considering factors such as the type of evidence and what emphasis
the parties placed on it at trial, both in terms of time spent and rele-
vance to their cases.2 42 Here, the testimony was just one small part of
the state's case against Tuggle. A reasonable jury could find future
dangerousness even without Dr. Centor's statements.
The second and more difficult aspect of the Ake error was the
court's denial of Tuggle's request for psychiatric assistance at the sen-
tencing phase.243 When Tuggle's counsel learned that the evaluation
286 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (Michie 1996).
237 Tugg/e V 116 S. Ct. at 285.
238 Id.
239 Tuggle VI, 79 F.3d at 1391. The improper admission of Dr. Centor's testimony was
likely the portion of the error that Justice Scalia was considering when he called this a
"straightforward inadmissible-evidence case." See Tuggle V, 116 S. Ct. 283, 285 (1995)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
240 Tuggle V, 79 F.3d at 1389 (citations omitted).
241 Correll v. Thompson, 63 F.3d 1279, 1291-92 (4th Cir. 1995) (on collateral review, the
court applied harmless error analysis to improperly admitted evidence). See aLso Satter-
white v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988). Satterwhite was the first case in which the Court ap-
plied harmless error analysis to a capital case.
242 Corre//, 63 F.3d at 1291-92; Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 249.
243 Tuggle V, 79 F.3d at 1380.
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had included a conclusion about future dangerousness, 244 he re-
quested and was denied an additional assessment by a psychiatrist of
his choosing.2 45 The Fourth Circuit stated that this denial was merely
an improper exclusion of evidence, similar to a denial of the right to
cross-examine a witness, so was no different than a harmless improper
admission of evidence.248 Language in the Ake opinion lends support
to this analysis. Justice Marshall wrote:
This is not to say, of course, that the indigent defendant has a constitu-
tional right to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to receive
funds to hire his own. Our concern is that the indigent defendant have
access to a competent psychiatrist... who will conduct an appropriate
examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of
the defense.2 47
The Fourth Circuit correctly held that Tuggle did not receive that
assistance. However, restricting a defendant's right to formulate the
game plan for his defense before he even enters the courtroom is not
quite the same as restricting a defendant's right to cross-examine a
witness. Nevertheless, the court's subsequent analysis supports the ul-
timate decision that, though unconstitutional, the Ake error here was
harmless.
To determine whether this second part of the Ake error was harm-
less, the Fourth Circuit divided the sentencing evidence into six areas:
(1) the strength of the remaining aggravating circumstance; (2) the evi-
dence admitted (both properly and improperly) at the sentencing hear-
ing to establish the invalid aggravating circumstance; (3) the evidence
improperly excluded at the sentencing hearing; (4) the nature of any
mitigating evidence; (5) the closing argument of the prosecutor; and (6)
any indications that the jury was hesitant or entertained doubt in reach-
ing its sentencing determination.2 48
The strength of the remaining aggravator has already been addressed,
as has the inadmissible evidence for the future dangerousness ag-
gravator. The admissible evidence for that aggravator included Tug-
gle's prior murder conviction, the fact that he murdered Havens while
on parole after serving only eleven of the twenty year sentence for that
earlier crime, his escape from prison, and the armed robbery he com-
244 Dr. Centor did not include his conclusions about Tuggle's future dangerousness in
his report since the court had not asked for such an evaluation. Instead, his report focused
solely on Tuggle's competence to stand trial and his sanity at the time of the crime. Re-
spondent's Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6-7, Tuggle v. Nether-
land, 117 S. Ct. 237 (1996) (No. 96-5364).
245 Tuggle 1f, 854 F. Supp. 1229, 1233 (W.D. Va. 1994).
246 Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (holding that harmless error analysis
was appropriate for a Confrontation Clause violation involving an improper restriction on
the defendant's right to cross-examine a government witness for bias).
247 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).
248 Tugg/e V, 79 F.3d at 1393.
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mitted shortly after murdering Havens.2 49 Finally, when the case went
to the jury, it returned a verdict after only a little more than an hour
of deliberation.2 50
The foregoing elements weigh against Tuggle. However, there
were two factors in his favor. There was mitigating evidence-three
witnesses testified, in essence, that Tuggle's parents did the best they
could in raising him and that he was a "good-natured" person.25 1
Also, the prosecutor improperly included in his closing argument a
statement that the jury could consider Dr. Centor's testimony when
deciding the "future dangerousness" aggravator.2 52 Taken as a whole,
this record does not establish that Dr. Centor's testimony had a "sub-
stantial and injurious effect or influence" on the jury's verdict.2 53 The
testimony that Tuggle showed "a high probability of future dangerous-
ness"254 is not reasonably related to the jury's unimpeachable finding
that the crime was vile. 255 Further, in balance with all the other prop-
erly admitted evidence that was before the jury, there is no compelling
reason to believe that Dr. Centor's testimony held any special weight
whatsoever. The error was harmless.
B. NO NEED FOR SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF THIS ISSUE
The Supreme Court rightly denied Tuggle's appeal of the Fourth
Circuit's decision. There is at this time no split in the circuits such
that the Court would take the case to provide some inter-jurisdictional
unity.256 The only other circuit courts that have addressed whether an
Ake error is subject to harmless error analysis are the Eighth and
Tenth Circuits, and they agree that it is subject to such analysis. 257
249 Id. at 1394.
250 Id. at 1395.
251 Id. at 1394.
252 Id.
253 Id. at 1395.
254 Id.
255 Tuggle's case does not raise the same issues as those in Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862
(1983). Zant presented the issue of whether a capital sentence could stand when the ap-
pellate court struck down one of the two aggravating circumstances found by the jury as
unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 880-84. The Court held that Stephens' conviction and
sentence could stand because, since Georgia was a non-weighing state, the remaining ag-
gravator was statutorily adequate to uphold the verdict. Id. at 890-91. In Tuggle's case,
however, the issue is not that an aggravator is found invalid on its face, but because of a
trial error involving improperly admitted evidence. Therefore, even though Virginia's stat-
utory scheme is nearly identical to Georgia's, Zant v. Stephens has no bearing on Tuggle's
case. In its 1995 Tuggle Vopinion, the Supreme Court clarified this issue and removed the
Stephens analysis from the case on remand. See Tuggle V, 116 S. Ct. 283 (1995).
256 See Sup. CT. R. 10 (allowing grant of certiorari "only for compelling reasons" includ-
ing conflict between the circuit courts of appeal).
257 The Eighth Circuit held that an Ake error is subject to harmless error analysis under
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V1. CONCLUSION
The public has little patience for lengthy appeal processes like
Tuggle's.258 A Florida supreme courtjustice's comment that the high
court spends fifty percent of its time on death cases is strong testi-
mony about a system that provides retribution at an extremely high
cost, both in real dollars and in lost opportunity for speedy resolution
of other cases.2 9
As long as capital sentencing statutes persist, these costs will per-
sist as the system attempts to avoid irreparable mistakes. Still, there
are places where we must draw the line. Burdening an already over-
whelmed court system with automatic resentencing for Ake errors goes
too far. As the Tenth Circuit demonstrated in Castro,260 a reviewing
court can find evidence in the record that points to the harm of this
error. And, as the Fourth Circuit found, sometimes the Ake error is
simply not harmful.
KRISTEN BROWN
the Chapman standard of "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Starr v. Lockhart, 23 F.3d
1280, 1291-92 (8th Cir. 1993), crt. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994). In Castro v. Oklahoma, 71
F.3d 1502 (10th Cir. 1995), the Tenth Circuit held that an Ake error was not harmless in
Castro's sentencing proceeding and so reversed his capital sentence. The Tenth Circuit
has developed a broad view of the Ake error as it affects the sentencing hearing- if the
defendant meets the threshold determination that his sanity will be a significant mitigating
factor, the state must provide access to an expert if presenting any evidence of future dan-
gerousness, notjust expert testimony about future dangerousness. See, e.g., Brewer v. Reyn-
olds, 51 F.3d 1519, 1529 (10th Cir. 1995); Liles v. Saffle, 945 F.2d 333, 340-41 (10th Cir.
1991).
258 See generaly Daniel E. Lungren & Mark L. Krotoski, Public Policy Lessons from the Robert
Alton Harris Case 40 UCLA L. REv. 295 (1992) (discussing case of Harris, who was on death
row for fourteen years for the double murder of teenage boys).
259 Marcia Coyle et al., Trial and Error in the Nation's Death Belt, NAT'I. Lj.,June 11, 1990,
at 30.
260 71 F.3d 1502 (10th Cir. 1995).
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